Initial Public Offerings in Hot and Cold Markets
The initialpublicoffering(IPO)marketfollowsa cyclewith dramaticswings,often referredto as hot and cold markets(e.g., IbbotsonandJaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) ). A hot IPO marketis characterizedby an unusuallyhigh volumeof offerings,severeunderpricing,frequent oversubscriptionof offerings,a preponderanceof smallerissues,and,to a certainextent,by concentrationsin particularindustries.l In contrast,cold IPO marketshave much lowerissuance, lessunderpricing, fewerinstancesof oversubscription, and largerofferings. Someresearchers havearguedthat theseswingsin the IPOmarketreflectchangesin investorsentiment,while othershavearguedtheyarisefromchangesin factorsthat affectthe decisionto issueequity,such as asymmetricinformationbetweeninvestorsand firms.
The decisionto issueequityin an asymmetricinformationsettinghas been examinedin signalingmodelsof IPOunderpricing(e.g.,Allenand Faulhaber(1989) ),the decisionto go public (ChemmanurandFulghieri(1995) ),andthe timingof the decisionto completea seasoned equityoffering(SEO)(e.g., Choe,MasulisandNanda(1993 ),Baylessand Chaplinsky(1996 ), andLucasandMcDonald(1990 ).2 In nearlyall of these models,the hot issue marketsoccur whenbetterqualityfirms are pulledinto the equitymarketas pricingbecomesmorefavorable.
In the IPOsignalingmodels,hot marketstypicallyoccurwhencertainindustriesexperience positiveshocksto expectedprofitabilitythat lead to a lowerlemonspremium. In the SEO models,the costs of asymmetricinformationare lowerin someperiodsdue to betterinvestment opportunities, less asymmetricinformation,or randompositiveprice changes.
The empiricalevidencedescribingissuersin hot and cold marketsis mixed. Choeet al.
andBaylessand Chaplinskyprovideevidencethat announcement effectsare less negativein hot markets,suggestingthat betterqualityfirmsissueequityin hot markets. Tests of the IPO IForexample, Ritter(1984) showsthat most of the underpricingin the hot issuemarket of 1980-1981is attributableto underpricingamongIPOSin the naturalresourcessector.
2Thereare manymodelsof the decisionto issueequityor to changethe debtiequityratio. We focushereon modelswith directimplicationsfor issuancein hot and cold markets.
signalingmodelsby Jegadeesh,Weinstein,andWelch(1993 ),Michaelyand Shaw(1994 )and Spiessand Pettway(1995 cast doubton the strengthof the relationshipbetweenunderpricing andfirm quality,suggestingthat hot issuemarketsmaynot reflectgreaterparticipationby high qualityIPOS.Morerecentevidenceon the poor long-termstockprice performanceof equity issuers(e.g.,Spiessand Affleck-Graves(1995) ,and hughran and Ritter (1995))suggeststhat equityissuersare below-averagequalityfirms,especiallyif theyissueequityin a hot market.
hughran and Ritter,in particular,arguethat the underperformanceresultsare evidenceof investoroveroptimismand managers'willingnessto take advantageof such sentiments.
In this paper,we analyzeIPOSthat werecompletedin two verydifferentmarkets,the hot We considerIPOfirms'operatingperformanceand stockreturnsfor up to five yearsafter the IPO,assumingthat firm qualitywouldbe revealedduringthis period. We find that in the yearof the IPOthe hot marketfirmsof 1983are less profitableand somewhatsmallerthan the firmsthat wentpublicin 1988;nor do theyappearto havegreatergrowthpotential. In the years followingthe IPO,both sets of firmsexhibitsomedeteriorationin profits,from abnormallyhigh levelsin the yearof the IPO,but neitherset underperformsotherfirms in the sameindustry.
Indeed,operatingperformancesof the two sets of firms are indistinguishable. Nevertheless,stock returnsfor the hot marketIPO firmsare quitepoor for severalyears,whereasreturnsfor the cold marketIPO stocksare morecomparableto thoseon NASDAQstocks. We find no evidencethat the hot marketIPO firms are superiorfirms,as the asymmetricinformationmodelspredict. Nor do we find,however,that the hot marketfirmsare inferior,as the underperformanceliterature suggests. We do find evidenceconsistentwiththe viewthat excessivelypositiveinvestor sentimentduringhot marketsleadsto long-termunderperformance.In particular,the sametype of firmhas lowerstockreturnsif it comespublicin a hot market.
The paperis organizedas follows:SectionII is a reviewof the theoryand evidenceon IPOcycles. We describeour data in SectionIIIandprovideevidencethat our samplesare appropriatefor studyinghot and cold IPOS. SectionW examinesthe operatingperformanceand stockreturnsof the two sets of firms. Becausethe timingof the IPOSin our sampleare separated by five years,it is possiblethat the goodIPOfirms in 1983are drawnfrom a different distributionthanthe goodIPO firmsof 1988. Thus,in SectionV we comparethe 1983hot marketIPOSto anotherset of cold marketIPOSthat are morelikelyto be drawnfrom the same distribution -firmsthat camepublicin the cold marketof 1982. SectionVI is a discussionof the relationshipbetweenstockmarketreturnsand operatingperformancein light of varying investorsentimentoverthe IPOcycle. SectionVII is the conclusion.
II. IPO Cycles: Theory and Evidence
In this sectionwe discussasymmetricinformationtheoriesthat explainwhythe volume of equityissuancevariesover time. Thesetheoriesincludemodelsof both IPOSand SEOS becausethe empiricalliteratureon underperformanceshowsthat both typesof equityofferings resultin poorlong-runreturns. We continuewith a summaryof the empiricalevidencevis-a-vis the theories'predictionsabouthot and cold equitymarkets,as well as empiricalresultsthat suggestmarketinefficiency.
A. Models ofEquityIssuancein HotandColdMarkets
The IPO signalingmodelsof underpricing,suchas thoseof Allen and Faulhaber(1989) , Welch(1989 )and Grinblattand Hwang(1989 Cheng(1995) suggeststhat stockpriceunderperformanceis relatedto the subsequentuse of SEOproceeds-firmsthat do not spendthe fundson capitalexpenditureshave worselongtermperformance.This is also suggestiveof managerialopportunismin hot markets,although he doesnot specificallyexaminehot andcold marketissuers. Lemer(1994) alsoprovidesevidencethat firmstake advantageof windowsof opportunityto issueequity. In his investigationof a groupof biotechnologyfirms that received fundsfromventurecapitalists,he concludesthat their IPOSare timedto coincidewith peaksin publicmarketprices.
Althoughthe evidenceon stockunderperformance pointsto hot marketissuersas the mainculpritin the groupof equityissuers,the indirectevidenceon the relationshipbetweenhot marketissuersand operatingperformanceoftenfails to confirmsucha pessimisticviewof hot marketIPOS.In particular,Jain and Kinifind no relationshipbetweenoperatingperformance and IPOunderpricing, whichis higherin hot markets;nor do Mikkelsonand Shah find a particularlystrongrelationshipbetweenoperatingperformanceand the yearin whichthe firm wentpublic. Our studyprovidesdirectevidencelinkingfirm qualityand IPO cycles.
III. Data
Our analysisof hot and cold marketscomparesfirmsthat wentpublicin 1983,whichwas an extraordinarilyhot year,withfirmsthat completedIPOSin 1988,a cold marketyearfor IPOS.
We choosethesetwo yearsbecausetheyare both recentenoughthat financialdata are broadly available,but not so recentthat we couldnot evaluatethe firmsoverfive years. Basedon the numberof nonfinancialIPOSsince 1980,shownin Table 1 Followinghughran and Ritter,we calculatereturnsfromtwo weeksafterthe IPO to morecloselyreplicatereturnsto a typicalinvestorwho maynot be allocatedsharesin the IPO.
Returnsare calculatedas the percentagedifferencein the priceon two days,adjustedfor splits anddistributions.Our focusis on returnsfrom two weeksafterthe IPO date until one,three and fiveyearslater. The returnsdistributionsare highlyskewed,so we avoidt-testsof means. 
IV. Relative Performance of Hot and Cold Market IPO Firms
We beginby describingthe typesof firmsthat go publicin each marketusing information on the distributionof firms by industryand accountingdatafromthe yearof the IPO. We next considerthe post-IPOperformanceof the hot andcold market~0 firms. If asymmetric informationtheoryis correct,the firmsthat go publicin hot yearsshouldeventuallyproveto be moresuccessfulfirmsthan the cold marketfirmsthat did not feel theywereundervalued.We alsocomparethis accountingdata to stockreturnsover similartimeperiodsto determineif stock pricesare reflectinga drop in performanceas the managerialopportunismtheorysuggests. 
B. Performancein SubsequentYears
Asymmetricinformationtheorysuggeststhat the qualityof hot and cold marketfirms is difficultto differentiateat the time of the offeringexceptthroughthe underpricingsignal. 
C. Post-IPOperformanceadjustedfor survivorshipbias
The stockreturnsin Table8 are quitedifferentfromthosepresentedin Table 3, which showunderperformance on averagefor both samplesand particularlypoor returnsfor the hot marketIPOS.Thereare severaldifferencesbetweenthe calculationsof the wealthrelativesin the two tables,but the mainone is that the returnsin Table 8 To correctfor possiblesurvivorshipbias, we investigatethe two sets of IPO firmswhile keepingincompletedata in the analysis. For operatingperformance,we includethe latest operatingresultsfor firmsthat exit the sampleprematurely.Thus,for example,the mediansales growthfigurefor yearfive will be basedmainlyon growthfrom yearfour to five, but will also be basedon data for nonsurvivingfirmsfromearlieryears.
Tables9 and 10presentmeasuresof operatingperformancefor the two IPO samples whendatafor nonsurvivorsare used in the calculations,Boththe hot and cold marketfirms look marginallyworsein Table9 whennonsurvivorsare used in the calculations. Nevertheless,most of the profitmeasuresremaininsignificantlydifferentfromthe medianof the industryand the adjustmentfails to differentiatethe samples. Whileindustry-adjustedsalesfall slightlyfor both setsof firms,the nonsurvivorsin the 1983sampleare muchsmaller,makingthe samples significantlydifferentby size. Growthrates in Table 10also are similarto those reportedin Table7. The growthrate of capitalexpendituresappearsto be belowthe industryaveragelater in the sampleperiodfor both sets of firms. We note,however,that both sets of firms invested muchmorethan their industrycounterpartsin the earlyyearsof the IPO (seeTables5 and 6).
Stockreturnsfor the calendarperiodscomparableto the accountingdata periodsfor these firmsarepresentedin Table 11 . The stockreturns,similarto thosein Table 3 
VI. Investor Sentiment and Stock Returns
The wealthrelativesof hot marketIPOSfall shortof the comparablefiguresfor the cold marketIPOSby most measures,yet our evidenceon operatingresultsdo not indicatesuch strong differencesbetweenthe two sets of firms. In this sectionwe investigatewhetherinvestor sentimentcan explainthis apparentdisconnectionbetweenstockreturnsand operating performance.To do so, we formportfoliosof stocksbasedon verysimilaroperating performance, calculatethe wealthrelativesof theseportfolios,and examinewhetherthey differ for the 1983and 1988samplesof IPO firms.
In particular,we partitionthe combinedgroupof 1983and 1988IPO firms into quartiles basedon alternativeperformancemeasures--industry-adjustedsalesgrowth,profit growth,and growthin capitalexpenditures.Basedon the valuesfor each measurein each time periodthat definesthe top and bottomquartilesfor the combinedgroup,we form portfoliosof the best and worstperformingfirms in the 1983and 1988samplesseparately,and reporttheir wealthrelatives in Table 13 . If investorsentimentis the samefor goodfirmsin both hot and cold markets,then the wealthrelativesfor theseportfoliosof similarfirms shouldnot varywith the yearin which theywentpublic. If hot marketfirmsare valuedmorethan cold marketfirms of similarquality at issuance,then the longtermperformanceshouldbe worsefor the hot marketfirms as their priceseventuallydeclineto thoseof comparablefirmsthat wentpublic in cold years. We note that thereare no significantdifferencesin the proportionsthat eachIPO samplecontributesto the best andworstgroups-it is not the case that the best IPOScontainmore 1988firms nor that the worstgroupshave a disproportionatenumberof 1983IPO firms.
The wealthrelativesfor the best and worstperformingfirmsin Table 13indicatea Althoughstrongsalesdoesnot appearto be highlyvaluedin all periods,even amongthe portfoliosbasedon salesgrowth,the cold marketfirmsof similarcaliberalwayshave superior stockreturns.
Theseresultssuggestthat investorsentimentin hot marketsmayhave led to pricesin 1983that werebid up too high. For otherwisecomparableperformancein the yearsfollowing the IPO,higherpriceswouldlead to lowerwealthrelativesas investorscooledoff to the hot marketinvestments.Sucha relationshipbetweenbid-uppricesand lowerreturnsis also documentedfor privateventurecapitalinvestmentsin the early 1980sthat led to verypoor longrun returns (Fenn,Liangand Prowse(1995) ).Theseresultsare also reminiscentof differences betweenvalueand glamourstockspointedout by Lakonishok,Shleiferand Vishney(1994) .
V. Conclusions
Inthis studywe examinethe qualityof IPOfirmsin hot andcold marketsto determineif Ourevidenceshowsthat the long-runoperatingperformanceof hot and cold market issuersdoesnot differsubstantiallyin the five yearsfollowingthe IPO. Thus, we find no evidencein favorof the asymmetricinformationtheoriesof equityissuancecyclesthat hot marketsare characterizedby betterfirms. At the sametime,our evidencedoes not supportthe viewof the stockpriceunderperformanceliteraturethat hot marketissuersare low qualityfirms withopportunisticmanagers. We find someevidencethat pricingis affectedby overoptimismin hot markets-the wealthrelativesfor firmsof similarcaliberare typicallylowerfor hot market firms,suggestinga declinefromunsustainablehighpricesimmediatelyfollowingthe IPO. Table 1 IPO Issuance by Year* 1980 Year* 1981 Year* 1982 Year* 1983 Year* 1984 Year* 1985 Year* 1986 Year* 1987 Year* 1988 Year* 1989 Year* 1990 Year* 1991 Year* 1992 Year* 1993 Year* 1994 Gross 
Annual returns on 1983 and 1988 IPO stocks
The sample includes firms that completed IPOSin 1983 and 1988 . Returns are calculatedfrom CRSPdaily shareprice data. Firmswith missingor questionabledataon CRSP are excludedfrom the sample. IPO returns (r) are calculatedusing daily data (not compounded)from the start of the year to the last day of the year for the first through fifth calendaryears after the IPO date. Firms that delisted prior to the first day of the period reportedare excludedfrom the calculationfor that period. For each IPO, we calculatethe return on the Nasdaq(rn)for the same period, which may be less than a year if the firm delists. The meansof each set of obsewations(ri and r.) are usedto computewealth relatives (1+ ri/l+ r~). The sample includesfirms that completed IPOSin 1983 and 1988 . Returns are calculatedfrom CRSPdaily sharepricedata. Firmswith missingor questionabledata on CRSP are excludedfrom the sample. IPOreturns(r) are calculatedusingdailydata (not compounded)from two weeks after the IPO date to the last day of the Ist, 3rd, of 5th full calendar year after the IPO. For each IPO return period, we calculatethe return on the Nasdaq(r~)for the same period, which may be less than a year if the firmdelists. The meansof each set of observations(riand rJ are usedto compute wealth relatives(1+ ri/l+ r~). Stockreturnsareadjustedfor dividendsand splitsfor IFO fms in 1983and 1988 . Years1,3, and 5 represent calenti years 1984 ,1986 ,and 1988for tie 1983IPO fins, and 1989 ,1991 
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